

Broken authentication

Når det beste ikke er godt nok

Alexander Hatlen @ KiNS:Tech 2024



Top 10 Web Application Security Risks

There are three new categories, four categories with naming and scoping changes, and some consolidation in the Top 10 for 2021.



* From the Survey

Før




- Gjenbruke det ene gode passordet
ELLER
- Ha unike passord, med et mønster

For de spesielt proffe


- Passordwallet


Nå

- Federation m/
Single-Sign On



Kanskje mer kjent som






Single sign-on (SSO)

 Microsoft
Entra ID

 okta



De fire tre store




WSFed

De vi snakker om i dag




OpenID
“OIDC”

Hvordan fungerer Single-Sign On / federering i OpenID Connect (OIDC)?



Hvordan fungerer Single-Sign On / federering i OAUTH?



(id_)token?

eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NilsImtpZCI6IjFMVE16Y
WtpaGISbGFfOHoyQkVKVlhIV01xbyJ9.eyJ2ZXIiOilyLjAiLCJpc
3MiOiJodHRwczovL2xvZ2luLm1pY3Jvc29mdG9ubGluZS5jb2
0vOTEyMjA0MGQtNmM2Ny00YzViLWIxMTItMzZhMzA0YjY2Z
GFkL3YyLjAiLCJzdWliOiJBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUF
BQUFJa3pxRIZyU2FTYUZleTc4MmJidGFRliwiYXVkljoiNmNiM
DQwMTgtYTNmNS00NmE3LWI5OTUtOTQwYzc4ZjVhZWYzli
wiZXhwIjoxNTM2MzYxNDExLCJpYXQiOjE1MzYyNzQ3MTEsI
m5iZil6MTUzNjl3NDcxMSwibmFtZSI6IkFiZSBMaW5jb2xuliwc
HJIzmVycmVkJ3VzZXJuYW1lIjoiQWJITGIAbWljcm9zb2Z0Lm
NvbSIsIm9pZCI6IjAwMDAwLTAwMDAtMDAwMC02Nm
YzLTMzMzJY2E3ZWE4MSIsInRpZCI6IjkxMjlwNDBkLTZjNjctN
GM1Yi1iMTEyLTM2YTMwNGI2NmRhZCIsIm5vbmNlljoiMTIzN
TlzljwiYWlviIjoiRGYyVVZYTDFpeCFsTUNXTVNPSkjjRmF0emN
HZnZGR2hqS3Y4cTVnMHg3MzJkUjVNQjVCaXN2R1FPN1IXQ
nlqZDhpUURMcSFIR2JJRGFreXA1bW5PcmNkcUhlWVNubHR
lcFFtUnA2QUlaOGpZIn0.1AFWW-Ck5nROwSIItm7GzZvDwUk
qvhSQpm55TQsmVo9Y59cLhRXpvB8n-55HCr9Z6G_31_Ube
Ukoz612I2j_Sm9FFShSDDjoaLQr54CreGIJvjtmS3EkK9a7SJB
bcnP1MpUtlfygow39tFjY7EVNW9plWUvRrTgVkJYLprvfzw-CI
qw3gHC-T7IK_m_xkr08INERBtaecwhTeN4chPC4W3jdmw_llx
zC48YoQ0dB1L9-lmX98Egypfrlbm0IBL5spFzL6JDZIRRJOu8v
ecJvj1mq-IUhGt0MacxX8jdxYLP-KUu2d9MbNKpCKJuZ7p8g
wTL5B7NIUdh_dmSviPWrw

base64(header).base64(payload).base64(signature)

```
{
    "typ": "JWT",
    "alg": "RS256",
    "x5t": "7_Zuf1tvkwLxYaHS3q6lUjUYIGw",
    "kid": "7_Zuf1tvkwLxYaHS3q6lUjUYIGw"
}
```

PAYOUT: DATA

```
{
    "iat": 1536275124,
    "nbf": 1536275124,
    "exp": 1536279024,
    "aio": "AXQAI/8IAAAqxsuB+R4D2rFQq0ET04YdXbLD9kZ8xfXadeAM0Q2Nk
NT5izfg3uwbWSXhuSSj6UT5hy2D6WqApB5jKA6ZgZ9k/SU27uV9cetX
fLOtpNttgk5DcBtk+LLstz/Jg+gYRmv9bUU4XlphTc6C86Jmj1FCw==",
    "amr": [
        "rsa"
    ],
    "email": "abeli@microsoft.com",
    "family_name": "Lincoln",
    "given_name": "Abe",
    "idp": "https://sts.windows.net/72f988bf-86f1-41af-
91ab-2d7cd011db47/",
    "ipaddr": "131.107.222.22",
    "name": "abeli",
    "nonce": "123523",
    "oid": "05833b6b-aa1d-42d4-9ec0-1b2bb9194438",
    "rh": "I",
    "sub": "5_J9rSss8-jvt_Icu6ueRNL8xXb8LF4Fsg_KooC2RJQ",
    "tid": "fa15d692-e9c7-4460-a743-29f2956fd429",
    "unique_name": "AbeLi@microsoft.com",
    "uti": "Lxe_46GqTkOpGSfTln4EAA",
    "ver": "1.0"
}
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

```
RSASHA256(
    base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
    base64UrlEncode(payload),
    Public Key in SPKI, PKCS #1,
```

Issue #1: aud(ience)

Issue #2: ls(uer)

Issue #3(0?): Email

Issue #4: Complicated signature verification

Issue #5: Mangel på Step-Up funksjonalitet

Issue #6: Multi-tenancy

In-App tenancy

Multi-tenancy funksjonalitet inni app.
Tenancy tilhørigheter.

Public vs private oauth/cloud apps

Hvem har lov til å benytte en “app” for pålogging?

The screenshot shows the 'Register an application' form in the Microsoft Azure portal. The 'Name' field is filled with 'KiNS ISO27001 app'. Under 'Supported account types', the first option ('Accounts in this organizational directory only (MSFT only - Single tenant)') is selected. The 'Redirect URI (optional)' section shows a dropdown menu set to 'Select a platform' and a text input field containing 'e.g. https://example.com/auth'. At the bottom, there is a note about agreeing to Microsoft Platform Policies and a 'Register' button.

Home > MSFT | App registrations >
Register an application ...

* Name
The user-facing display name for this application (this can be changed later).
KiNS ISO27001 app ✓

Supported account types
Who can use this application or access this API?
 Accounts in this organizational directory only (MSFT only - Single tenant)
 Accounts in any organizational directory (Any Microsoft Entra ID tenant - Multitenant)
 Accounts in any organizational directory (Any Microsoft Entra ID tenant - Multitenant) and personal Microsoft accounts (e.g. Skype, Xbox)
 Personal Microsoft accounts only
[Help me choose...](#)

Redirect URI (optional)
We'll return the authentication response to this URI after successfully authenticating the user. Providing this now is optional and it can be changed later, but a value is required for most authentication scenarios.
Select a platform e.g. https://example.com/auth

Register an app you're working on here. Integrate gallery apps and other apps from outside your organization by adding from [Enterprise applications](#).

By proceeding, you agree to the Microsoft Platform Policies [↗](#)

Register

The results surprised us: 25% of all the multi-tenant apps we scanned were vulnerable to authentication bypass.

- Wiz.io

Issue #7: Lack of implementation guidelines

Makes stuff like using email typical, or ending up with Single Sign-Up...

Multi-tenancy issues.

AuthZ is a bit limited, easier to implement on app-side than IdP.

Very few default/required claims, big differences in IdPs.

Issue #8: Microsoft Conditional Access fallacy

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Azure Conditional Access PolicyBlade interface. The left pane displays the policy configuration steps: New Conditional Access policy, Control access based on Conditional Access policy to bring signals together, make decisions, and enforce organizational policies. It includes sections for Name (Example: 'Device compliance app policy'), Assignments (Users: 0 users and groups selected), Cloud apps or actions (No cloud apps, actions, or authentication contexts selected), Conditions (0 conditions selected), Access controls (Grant: 0 controls selected, Session: 0 controls selected), and Enable policy (Report-only, On, Off). The right pane is titled 'Session' and describes controlling access based on session controls to enable limited experiences within specific cloud applications. It lists several options with checkboxes: Use app enforced restrictions (info: This control only works with supported apps. Currently, Office 365, Exchange Online, and SharePoint Online are the only cloud apps that support app enforced restrictions.), Use Conditional Access App Control, Sign-in frequency, Persistent browser session, Customize continuous access evaluation, Disable resilience defaults, and Require token protection for sign-in sessions (Preview). A 'Select' button is at the bottom right of the pane.

Issue #9-99: Alle de andre angrepene mot oauth

Token replay


Device code phishing

Javascript-stealable tokens (and refresh tokens..)


Access tokens kan ikke revokeres

Mange diverse ting i utdaterte OAUTH flows før versjon 2.1. Gjenstår noen få problemer på protokoll-nivå, men det aller meste av trøbbel skjer ved implementasjon.

Demo



Original bing.com results



Modified bing.com results

WIZ*

Konklusjon

Positivt

- En veldig god og sikker protokoll
- Sikker som banken!
- Forenkler hverdagen for brukerne
- Raskere å jobbe, ingen passord-gjenbruk, ingen behov for passwordwallet, sømløs brukeropplevelse
- Gir kontroll på SaaS gjennom identitets-federering
- Gir logging for pålogginginger i eksterne applikasjoner
- Lar deg sentralt håndtere lifecycle av brukere i fagapplikasjoner
- Perfekt å bruke sammen med passordløs autentisering for å fjerne phishing-risikoer

Negativt/obs

- Implementasjon på tjenestetilbyder-siden er alfa omega
- Mangler MYE implementasjons-guiding
- De som lager OAUTH app må ha kontroll på tenant-scope og aksessstilganger
- Apper bør allow-listes i enhver business tenant for å hindre phishing og persistens fra angripere
- “Identitet er den nye perimeteren” hindrer ikke tilgang til å utnytte sårbarheter i tjenesten slik nettverksperimeter gjør (husk at exploiting har skutt i været forbi phishing i 2023)

Thank You

paloaltonetworks.com



Alexander Hatlen
Løsningssspesialist
@ Palo Alto Networks
ahatlen@paloaltonetworks.com