

telenor



# 5G Introduction and Security Perspectives

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# Today's Menu

A background image showing a buffet line at a formal event. People in black tuxedos and dresses are seen from the side, holding white plates and serving themselves from a long counter of metal trays filled with various dishes like salads, breads, and meats. The lighting is warm and focused on the food.

1. The Promise of 5G
2. 5G Innovations Supporting New Usecases
3. Select Security Improvements in 5G
4. Key Security-Relevant Changes
5. Security Challenges
6. Private Networks and Edge Offering
7. 5G network criticality and robustification
8. 5G deployment plan 2022



# Today's Menu



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## Not on the Menu Today:

- **Supply chain risk and attack surface**
  - It's there
  - It's not unique to 5G
  - It's a growing concern
  - It's being addressed
  - It's worth a talk of its own – or more
- **The criticality of available and trustworthy connectivity in the *connected society***
  - You know it, I know it, we all know it
  - Significant part of the reason why '5G security' is high on so many agendas in the first place



# Super-duper-over-simplified: A mobile network





# The Promise of 5G





# 5G vs. LTE – Industry Targets

**5G**

Latency

**1** ms  
E2E  
Latency



Throughput

**10G** bps  
Per  
Connection



Connections

**1,000K**  
Connections  
Per km<sup>2</sup>



Mobility

**500** km/h  
High-speed  
Railway



Network  
Architecture

**Slicing**  
Ability  
Required



Gap

**30~50x**

**100x**

**100x**

**1.5x**

**NFV/SDN**

LTE

30~50ms

100Mbps

10K

350Km/h

Inflexible



2


# 5G Innovations Supporting New Usecases



# Innovations Enabling New Usecases - **Faster**




# Innovations Enabling New Usecases - **Massive**







# Innovations Enabling New Usecases – **Latency / Reliability**



# Innovations Enabling New Usecases – QoS / Slicing




# Innovations Enabling New Usecases – **Virtualisation and MEC**






# Innovations Enabling New Usecases – **Localised Data Routing**




# Innovations Enabling New Usecases – **Direct Communications**




# «We're deploying 5G»


## «Non-Standalone» (NSA)



## «Standalone» (SA)



# Current Non-standalone 5G is addressing eMBB use-cases and FWA



- eMBB/FWA
- 5G Terminals
- Smart Home
- Smart Cities
- Industrial Control/Automation
- Aquaculture Automation
- ... and the list goes on ...




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## Select Security Improvements in 5G




# Improved Home Control and Interconnect Security

- **Improved home control;** verified roaming subscriber presence
  - User Equipment message required to be signed with home network public key



- **Improved Interconnect Security**

- End-to-end integrity protection
- Sensitive elements end-to-end confidentiality protected



# Improved Subscriber Privacy

- Previous generations have specified a temporary identifier to be used on the radio interface, but
  - Changing the TMSI - ever – is optional!
  - Simple tricks like provoking ATTACH, makes the terminal transmit its permanent identifier (IMSI) in clear.
- Finally in 5G, we seem to have got it right!
  - The **SU**bscriber **P**ermanent **I**dentify (SUPI) is never transmitted over the air, only the ephemeral **SU**bscriber **C**oncealed **I**dentify (SUCI), and
  - Paging of the UE by SUPI is not allowed.






# Integrity protection of *User Plane*

- Researchers have demonstrated how lack of integrity controls on radio *user plane* in previous generations, allows for manipulation of encrypted communications.
- In 5G, *user plane* integrity control is mandatory.

Example:  
The “aLTER” DNS  
redirection attack



ALTER: Overview of the DNS redirection attack.

Details at  
<https://alter-attack.net>



# Authentication

- Updated, unified algorithms
  - 5G-EAP and EAP-AKA
- Access agnostic
  - Both can be applied to 3GPP and non-3GPP access.
- **Optional secondary authentication**
  - **between the mobile device and an external data network.**




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# Key Security-Relevant Changes





# Changes: 1. Edge Compute (MEC)



gNodeB-DU

«midhaul»



Resource sharing and cross-exposure?

Physical vs. logical security balance?

thousands

more than a few Telenor OPEN

a few




# Changes: 2. External Exposure of Core

- Use cases depend on core functions exposure
- **NEF (Network Exposure Function) in the 5G architecture provides API-based exposure of core functions to 3rd parties**
- A material expansion of the attack surface
- Risk relates to vulnerabilities and misconfiguration of the API layer and functions (NEF) or authentication function.

# Changes: 3. Service Bus Architecture




- **Design based on “zero-trust” network philosophy;**
  - all functions are available to one another over the service bus, but
  - all access, use and communications are **authenticated** and positively **authorised**.
- **The secured communication between all NFs inside a PLMN is based on TLS with:**
  - **Confidentiality** protection by encryption, **Integrity** protection by hash validation, **Authentication** by certificates.
- **But; does not preclude further connectivity-restricting / network level security measures.**




# Changes: 4. New Signalling Stack

- Radical shift to Internet standards and protocols
- Well-maintained and subject to a lot of security research and offensive activity
- Risk:
  - Implementing and operating organisations unfamiliar with securely applying, configuring and operating this stack
  - High availability of offensive research and attack tools
  - Lower-tier attackers more familiar with it





# Changes: 5. Slicing



5

# Security Challenges



# Backwards Compatibility and Interoperation with Legacy

- **Older terminals, roaming and interconnect requires legacy support and backwards compatibility**
  - UEs may be susceptible to downgrade attacks (radio)
  - Old interconnect signalling protocols (e.g. SS7 and Diameter) still need to be supported



- **Internal interoperability with 4G core**
  - Even 5G “Stand Alone”, has interconnections with the 4G core.



# Significantly Different Use



- Security methods designed for networks with mostly human use phone devices, may no longer be suitable
- 5G supports a plethora of diverse use cases and terminals
- Slicing allows for differentiation of security mechanisms, priorities, policies and approaches.









# Got PKI(s)?

- Cryptographically rooted security permeates all aspects of 5G.
- Defining the PKI domain scopes and hierarchies is a design challenge.


- Needed everywhere, e.g.:

- **RAN**
  - UE
  - Network
- **Core Service Bus (VNFs/CNFs)**
  - Slicing
- **Roaming/interconnect**
- **Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure**
  - Compute
  - Management
- **Special domains, e.g. lawful interception**
- **Services / Service platforms**
- **Business Applications (BSS)**




# The Shift to Fully Virtualised

## 3GPP 5G Core (virtualised) Functions



## Virtualisation Infrastructure Architecture



# The Shift to Fully Virtualised

- **Disparate trust levels may share compute resources**
- **Vulnerabilities in assumed segregation**
  - hardware (e.g. x86, mem.) vulnerabilities,
  - hypervisor escapes,
  - VM escapes,
  - container escapes and
  - application-level vulnerabilities,
- **Somewhat immature** security tools and practices
- **Advanced adversaries exploit shared resources** to pivot








## Hence, we

- Apply some **physical segregation**
- Mandate granular logical **micro-segmentation**
- Design to **minimise cross-exposure** through shared resources
- Continuously **identify and apply further security tools and techniques**
- Instrument for in-depth **security monitoring**
  - Pervasive log collection from “everything”
  - Granular IP traffic metadata collection
  - Various host measures as technically applicable
  - Traffic capture and analysis capabilities





# The Increasing Complexity



- Significant complexity increase!
- Requires integrated orchestration across domains, layers and technologies.
- Requires robust automation for operation and security.




# Vulnerabilities Are Being Identified!

- And that is a very good thing!
- Telco has gone from niche to mainstream among all kinds of security researchers.
- Telco adoption of «commodity» tech, brings more vulnerabilities into telco relevancy.

**Hax0rs**, please report findings to the *GSMA's Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Programme!*

<https://www.gsma.com/security/gsma-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure-programme/>

[security@gsma.com](mailto:security@gsma.com)



5G network slicing flaw with potential for data leakage attack

**black hat**  
USA 2021

ATTEND TRAININGS BRIEFINGS ARSENAL FEATURES

All times are Pacific Time

ALL SESSIONS

SPEAKERS

**5G IMSI Catchers Mirage**

Ravishankar Borgaonkar | Research Scientist, SITNEF  
Altatf Shaik | Security Researcher, TU Berlin  
Format: 40-Minute Briefings  
Tracks: Network Security, Mobile

IMSI catchers aka Stingrays aka fake base stations are becoming more undetectable and silent attacks. Finally, new security types of issues.

In this talk, we carefully investigate new security problems on mobile devices. Besides, we explain our failure and successful results explaining the impact of 5G IMSI catchers at vendors, operators, and end-users and directions

sciencdo

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2019

Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Lucca Hirschi\*, Shinjo Park, and Altaf Shaik

## New Privacy Threat on 3G, 4G, and Upcoming 5G AKA Protocols

**Abstract:** Mobile communications are used by more than two-thirds of the world population who expect security and privacy guarantees. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) responsible for the worldwide standardization of mobile communication has designed and mandated the use of the AKA protocol to protect the subscribers' mobile services. Even though numerous subscriber leakage attacks have been demonstrated against AKA, this paper, we reveal a new privacy attack against all variants of the AKA protocol, including 5G AKA, that reaches subscriber privacy more severely than known real vulnerabilities do. Our attack exploits a new protocol fix. We demonstrate the practical feasibility of our attack using low cost and widely available setups. We conduct a security analysis of the vulnerability and discuss countermeasures to remedy our attack.

**Introduction**

In 2018, around 5 billion mobile subscribers used with Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) are accessing cellular network services (internet, calls), mostly relying on 3G, 4G, and 5G networks [7-15]. The fake base station attacks typically exploit weaknesses in the AKA protocol such as the non-protected identity request mechanism (e.g., with IMSI-catchers [9-15]) and the privacy-link resulting from authentication failure messages [7, 8]. In practice, while privacy was an explicit requirement for 3G and 4G [5, 6], numerous fake base station attacks have been shown to compromise subscriber privacy in these networks [7-15]. The fake base station attacks typically exploit weaknesses in the AKA protocol such as the non-protected identity request mechanism (e.g., with IMSI-catchers [9-15]) and the privacy-link resulting from authentication failure messages [7, 8]. In practice,

## Nori: Concealing the Concealed Identifier in 5G

John Preuß Mattsson and Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi  
Ericsson Research, Sweden  
{john.mattsson, prajwol.kumar.nakarmi}@ericsson.com

May, 2021

**Abstract**

IMSI catchers have been a long standing and serious privacy problem in pre-5G mobile networks. To tackle this 3GPP introduced the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) in 5G. In this paper, we analyze the new SUCI mechanism and discover that it provides very poor anonymity when used with the variable length Network Specific Identifiers (NSI), which are part of the 5G standard. When applied to real-world name length data, we see that SUCI only provides 1-anonymity, meaning that individual subscribers can easily be identified and tracked. We strongly recommend 3GPP and GSMA to standardize and recommend the use of a padding mechanism for SUCI before variable length identifiers get more commonly used. We further show that the padding schemes, commonly used for network traffic, is not optimal for padding of identifiers based on real names. We propose a new improved padding scheme that achieves much less message expansion for a given k-anonymity.

**Keywords**— 5G, IMSI catcher, SUPI, SUCI, IMSI, NSI, Privacy, Anonymity, Subscription Concealed Identifier, Identity Protection, Padding Scheme, Name Length Distribution

### 1 Introduction

Cellular devices such as mobile phones, tablets, and wearables have become more pervasive. The leakage of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is also scrutinized more than ever, and rightfully so. One main category of PII consists of the permanent identifier exposed in the radio interface of a cellular network. In all pre-5G cellular networks (2G, 3G, and 4G), an attacker can obtain this identifier from the radio interface using so-called "IMSI catchers", and identify as well as track victims [8, 33, 12, 19, 18]. To solve this problem, 5G introduced the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) mechanism used to encrypt the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). SUCI is calculated by using Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [31, 32].

In this paper we discover a vulnerability (Section 4) in how 3GPP standard TS 33.501 [7]. A


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# Private Networks and Edge Offering



# 5G technology supports digitalisation


With digitalisation and IT-OT interconnection, comes an increase in attack surface







## IT vs OT



- Security focus on full CIA triad, often emphasis on *confidentiality* and *integrity*
- High rate of change, agile, devops. Frequent change-windows, if at all structured into windows.
- Tolerant of minor outages, failures, and need for fixes.
- Used to being exposed and interconnected. High cybersecurity focus.
- Need for keeping all HW and SW in-support and security patched well understood.
- Staff often separate from, culturally different from and mistrusting of the OT staff.

- Security focus traditionally highly centered on *availability*
- Low rate of change. Highly tested for functionality and stability. Very infrequent change-windows.
- Outages can have devastating, even catastrophic consequences.
- Used to being on a closed network. Limited cybersecurity focus and competence.
- Huge «technological debt», from a cybersecurity perspective. Lots of legacy.
- Staff often separate from, culturally different from and mistrusting of the IT staff.

- 
- We see an increase in digitalisation, OT exposure, IT-OT interconnection and IIoT rollout initiatives with inadequate consideration for the cybersecurity implications.
  - When what was formerly on isolated networks is interconnected or exposed, security *must* be considered. For many integrated IIoT solutions and legacy OT infrastructures, security must be built underneath, around and in-between.



**Private cellular networks**  
are dedicated cellular networks, established  
to support business-critical processes.

**Edge Computing**  
moves (cloud) compute closer to where  
data is being created and consumed,  
primarily motivated by low-latency use-  
cases.

# The perfect storm



# Key industries harvesting benefits from digitalisation supported by the 5G-enablement



Industrial / manufacturing




Health



Defense / security



Transport



Energy, oil and gas


Telenor OPEN

Sensitivity: Internal



# Key drivers & needs

*Though low latency is often a prerequisite, there is a range of other major use cases and customer needs for Edge*





Mobil  
Pasientmonitor

Dedikert 5G konnektivitet og  
sikker transport

Sikker sky teknologi  
integret med Telenor  
og Infiniwell

Avstands-oppfølging i  
sanntid med kunstig  
intelligens assistanse



Non-invasive | mobilitet

i samarbeid med



Økt bruk av MTU i medisinsk avstandsoppfølging stiller nye krav til mobilnett

MTU plattformer flyttes over til globale skyleverandører

Utvikling av edge computing og 5G, muliggjør lokal prosessering og lagring av data med optimal responstid nye usecases








Oslo  
universitetssykehus



Foto: OUS




# Implementation of a Private Network with Helse SørØst










## HERØYA YARA BIRKELAND

Autonom havn og skip – drift og logistikk . Her kobles mennesker, maskiner og sensorer sammen for mer effektiv industriell produksjon. Det dreier seg også om digitalisering av arbeidsprosesser – tilgang til informasjon, kunnskap og kommunikasjon uavhengig av tid og sted, med 5G



# Private Networks

- Private networks as such is not new, but use of 3GPP technology in private networks is.
- Closely related to edge computing.
- Part of a continuum of connectivity and computing – from extreme edge to public cloud.



Radio Dot

Power

IRU


BBU

Switch

FW

Local cloud w/  
sw-defined core


- Includes local cloud environment.
- Alternative is to connect to regional cloud



Micro Radio

Radio Dots

Indoor or outdoor Radio units



ERICSSON

Private Networks on the edge (5G & LTE)


Pre-packaged Core Network

- No cloud solution included. Can be added locally or connect to regional cloud





# Edge Offering: Compute and Network, from Edge to Public Cloud







A robust network is required to support the increasing criticality



# Consolidation onto 5G – as a technology and as a network – significantly increases criticality





Telenor har mål om å bygge verdens mest hardføre nett - innføring av doble linjeføringer (dual-homing)

Telenor-5G på Elverum

Foto: Martin Phillip Fjellanger

Telenor OPEN




# Utfordringen: Økt krav om høy mobil oppetid

- Økt samfunnsmessig avhengighet av kommunikasjonsløsninger, spesielt mobil
- Utfasing av kobbernettet
- Nye og kritiske anvendelser på 5G – særlig i det offentlige og i næringslivet
- Økende grad av ekstremvær med tilhørende feilsituasjoner



# Eksempler på feilsituasjoner med enkel linjeføring




## Mulige feilsituasjoner:

- 1) Fiberbrudd – én eller flere basestasjoner nede
- 2) Node- eller kraftfeil – flere basestasjoner nede
- 3) Fiberbrudd, node- eller kraftfeil på basestasjon – 1 nede




# Dobbel linjeføring (dual homing) gir forbedret redundans til basestasjonene

Single Homing (AS-IS)




Dual Homing (TO-BE with 5G)



- To hovedløsninger:
- 1) Bruk av mørk fiber
  - 2) Bruk av passiv WDM



# Eksempler på feilsituasjoner med dobbel linjeføring



## Mulige feilsituasjoner

- 1) Fiberbrudd – ingen kundekonsekvens
- 2) Node- eller kraftfeil – ingen kundekonsekvens
- 3) Fiberbrudd, node- eller kraftfeil på basestasjon – 1 nede




# 5G-utbyggingen: Telenor bygger et modernisert og mer redundant transportnett

## Mobilt kjernenett



## Hovedelementer:

- Økt redundans til basestasjon – Dual Homing
- Høy kapasitet i Metro og Kjerne – 100 Gbit/s
- Høy kapasitet til basestasjon - 10 Gbit/s
- Synkronisering PTP (fase/frekvens – 8275.1)
- Skivedeling mm.






# 5G Deployment plan 2022








# På ett år er brukeropplevelsen i Telenors mobilnett blitt mer enn dobbelt så god



**4G/5G 2020 til 2021**



**4G/5G 2020 til 2021  
med 5G-telefon**

Telenor OPEN

Alle tall hentet fra resultater basert på målinger av brukere av Ookla Speedtest app.






# Telenor har modernisert 1000 basestasjoner så langt i 2021

Telenors 5G-utbygging i 2021 er i rute: *Kongsberg, Trondheim, Elverum, Bodø, Fornebu, Kvitfjell, Mausund, Svalbard, Oslo, Askvoll/Flokeneset, Bergen, Stavanger, Ålesund, Tromsø, Kristiansand, Fredrikstad og Drammen.*

**For å gi kundene våre 5G må vi oppgradere radionettet og aktivere et nytt transportnett:**



*Modernisert radionett gir 5G radioteknologi, men det er ikke nok.*


*Modernisert transportnett er nødvendig for en god 5G-opplevelse*



Mange vil få 5G-dekning utover året på stedene Telenor er i gang med modernisering



# Utbyggingsplan 2022: Nye kommuner i alle fylker vil få 5G fra Telenor i 2022







Vi bygger fremtidens mobilnett

5G

5G

5G

telenor

Telenor  
Alltid med

telenor

telenor

Telenor  
Alltid med

Telenor  
Alltid med

Telenor OPEN





# Viktig for 2022 er å bygge 5G-dekning på populære ferie- og fritidssteder

## Klar før sommeren 2022

Sarpsborg  
Arendal  
Kragerø  
Færder (Nøtterøy/Tjøme)  
Larvik  
Moss  
Sandefjord  
Tønsberg  
Bamble  
Frogn  
Hvaler  
Råde



## Klar for vinteren 2022/2023

Gausdal (Skeikampen)  
Hemsedal  
Hol (Geilo)  
Ringebu (Kvitfjell)  
Ringsaker (Sjusjøen)  
Trysil  
Øyer (Hafjell)  
Lillehammer



**Agder:**  
Arendal, Grimstad,  
Lindesnes

**Innlandet:**  
Gausdal, Lillehammer, Ringebu,  
Ringsaker, Trysil, Øyer

**Viken:**  
Frogn, Hemsedal, Hol, Hvaler, Moss, Råde,  
Sarpsborg, Vestby, Halden

**Vestfold og Telemark:**  
Bamble, Færder, Kragerø, Larvik, Sandefjord,  
Tønsberg, (Skien, Holmestrand, Porsgrunn)

Telenor OPEN








# I løpet av 2022 vil disse kommunene ha 5G-dekning fra Telenor

Blått representerer områder bygget/planlagt i 2020-2021




# Flere steder vil bli modernisert med 4G og de fleste får 5G – gir et godt bredbåndstilbud til kundene

I tillegg til utbygging beskrevet i overnevnte slider foreligger plan om oppstart på utrulling av moderniserte basestasjoner i inntil 150 kommuner\*\*

ALSTAHAUG	FRØYA	KÅFJORD	OS (INNLANDET)	SØR-AURDAL
ALVDAL	GAMVIK	LESJA	OSTERØY	SØRFOLD
ANDØY	GJERDRUM	LILLESAND	PORSANGER	SØR-FRON
AREMARK	GOL	LOM	RANDABERG	SØRREISA
ASKVOLL	GRAN	LOPPA	RENNEBU	SØR-VARANGER
AUKRA	GRATANGEN	LUND	RISØR	TANA
AURE	GRONG	LUNNER	ROLLAG	TIME
AURLAND	GULEN	LUSTER	RØROS	TVEDESTRAND
AUSTEVOLL	HADSEL	LYNGEN	SALTDAL	TYNSET
AUSTRHEIM	HAMMERFEST	LÆRDAL	SAMNANGER	TYSVÆR
BALSFJORD	HAREID	MARKER	SAUDA	ULLENSVANG
BARDU	HARSTAD	MASFJORDEN	SEL	ULSTEIN
BEIARN	HATTFJELLDAL	MIDTRE GAULDAL	SELJORD	VADSØ
BINDAL	HITRA	MIDT-TELEMARK	SENJA	WARDØ
BIRKENES	HJELMELAND	MODALEN	SIGDAL	VEFSN
BRØNNØY	HOLE	MODUM	SILJAN	VEGA
BØMLO	HURDAL	MOSKENES	SIRDAL	VENNESLA
DOVRE	HUSTADVIKA	MÅLSELV	SKIPTVET	VERDAL
DØNNA	HYLLESTAD	NAMSOS	SKJERVØY	VESTRE SLIDRE
EIDFJORD	HØYANGER	NAMSSKOGAN	SKJÅK	VESTVÅGØY
EIDSKOG	HØYLANDET	NANNESTAD	SOKNDAL	VINJE
EIGERSUND	HÅ	NARVIK	STAD	VOSS
ENGERDAL	IVELAND	NESBYEN	STEIGEN	VÅGAN
EVJE OG HORNNES	JEVNAKER	NOME	STEINKJER	VÅGÅ
FARSUND	KARASJOK	NORD-FRON	STORFJORD	VÅLER (VIKEN)
FAUSKE	KARLSØY	NORD-ODAL	STRAND	ØKSNES
FJORD	KLEPP	NORDRE LAND	STRANDA	ØRLAND
FLATANGER	KRØDSHERAD	NORE OG UVDAL	STRYN	ØYSTRE SLIDRE
FLEKKEFJORD	KVAM	NOTODDEN	SULDAL	ÅFJORD
FLESBERG	KVINESDAL	OPPDAL	SYKKYLVEN	ÅL
FLÅ	KVINNHERRAD	ORKLAND	SØNDRE LAND	ÅMOT
FROSTAD	KVÆNANGEN			ÅSNES

Kartet under viser total utbyggingsplan 2020 – 2022\*



Telenor OPEN

\* Med forbehold om endring i planene

Sensitivity: Internal Med forbehold om endring i planene. Inkluderer også nye basestasjoner



An aerial photograph of a coastal town in Norway, likely Lofoten, with a large mountain peak in the background. The scene is overlaid with a network diagram consisting of white dots and lines, representing a 5G network. The text is centered on the left side of the image.

# Telenor-5G i hele Norge

5G i hele nettet i løpet av første halvår 2024

Går fra 8400 basestasjoner til 9000



So...







**Is it safe?**


# 5G Security – Bottom Line

- **5G (3GPP) is by far the most secure cellular technology specification we have ever had!**
  - Specified with security in mind from the ground up
  - Built on proven constructs and concepts
  - The entire industry is more security-aware, -conscious and -competent than ever
  - The ability to provide security suited to support the *connected society* is an imperative
- **5G is by far the most challenging generation of mobile infrastructure to secure!**
  - Complexity
  - Layered virtualisation
  - Integrations and exposures
  - Distributed functions
  - Rate of change
  - Agility and vulnerability management
  - Prevalence and volume of machine-type terminals
  - Variety of use cases
- **Pervasive digitalisation and interconnectedness enabled by 5G, brings new dependencies, increases criticality and expands the attack surface.**

**Embrace 5G!**

**Seek a competent partner!**





# telenor



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